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SECTION 501(a) OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT
William P. Kratzke*
INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA) in 1959, 1 the federal courts have been un-
able to agree upon a consistent determination of the limits of the
fiduciary obligations of union officials under section 501(a). 2 Gener-
ally, the decisions tend to fall into two categories — the restrictive, or
"narrow" view of the fiduciary obligations, and the expansive, or
"broad" view of the obligations. The narrow view, espoused by the
*B.A., 1971, U. Wash.; J.I)., 1974, Valparaiso U.; LL.M., 1977, Georgetown U., Visiting
Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
29 U.S.C. §§ 40l et seq. (1970) [hereinafter "LMRDA").
'Section 501(a) of the LMRDA provides:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and
its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, tak-
ing into account the special problems and functions of a labor organiza-
tion, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the organiza-
tion and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in ac-
cordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the gov-
erning bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such or-
ganizations as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any
matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any
pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such or-
ganization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by
him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him
or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpa-
tory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization
or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to re-
lieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this
section shall be void as against public policy.
29 U.S.C. 501(a) (1970).
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Second Circuit, 3
 restricts application of section 501(a) to union affairs
involving money and property; the broad view, first announced by the
Eighth Circuit, 4 applies fiduciary obligations to a wide range of union
activities.
Despite their differences in approach, courts applying either
view tend to apply inflexible standards to the conduct of union of-
ficers. While the statute itself mandates that the duty of all officers be
determined "taking into account the special problems and functions of
a labor organization ... ," 5 few courts seem to have recognized this
caveat in evaluating the conduct of union officials. Both the narrow
and broad interpretations involve the application of inflexible stan-
dards to the conduct of officers of all labor organizations, large or
small, strong or weak, without regard to the type of union involved.
The net result has been the emergence of a per se type of reasoning
wherein courts hold certain types of acts by union officials conclu-
sively violative of section 501(a).'
This discussion will first focus upon the legislative history and
text of section 501(a) to determine the congressional purpose in enact-
ing the section. Second, the decisional evolution of the narrow and
broad judicial interpretations of section 501(a) will be reviewed. Fi-
nally, a flexible approach to the application of section 501(a) will be
proposed and such an approach will be examined in the context of
four recurrent patterns of internal union politics. It will be dem-
onstrated that courts should not deem acts of union officials per se
violative of section 501(a) where union political matters are involved,
but rather should examine the challenged activities in the context of
the particular union and circumstances involved.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SECTION 501(a) AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of section 501(a) 7 clearly reveals a con-
gressional intent that the fiduciary obligations imposed on union offi-
cials should extend beyond the management of "money or other prop-
erty." Indeed, various provisions limiting fiduciary obligations to
'See text and notes 22-40 infra.
' See text and notes 41-87 infra.
' 29 U.S.C. 501(a) (1970).
This per se approach is similar to the per se reasoning utilized by courts with
regard to violations of 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. I et seq. (Stipp. V
1975). See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1972);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5 (1958); United States v. E. I. Du-
pont de Neniours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 387 (1956).
'The complete legislative history of the LMRDA has been published by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. See NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscrosuitE Act- OF 1959 (1959) [hereinafter "LEcast.ATIVE
HISTORY"]. Moreover, the history of 501 has been examined by several commentators.
See, e.g., Clark, The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials under Section .501 of the LMRDA, 52
MINN, L. REV. 437, 440-44 (1967); Note, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1190-91 (1975); Note,
5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 367, 375-76 (1975); Comment, 37 LA. L. REV. 875 (1977).
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money or other property were explicitly rejected by both houses of
Congress.
As reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, Senate Bill 1555 originally contained no provision whatever im-
posing fiduciary responsibilities on union officials. 8 After amendments
were offered on the Senate floor, however, the final version of the
Senate bill included fiduciary obligations 9 limited to money and prop-
erty matters. 10
By contrast, House Bill 8342, passed by the House of
Representatives, contained a provision imposing broad fiduciary obli-
gations on union officials from the outset." Specifically, the House
Report accompanying the bill explained that:
[t]he Committee bill is broader and stronger than the pro-
visions of S.1555 which relate to fiduciary responsibilities.
S.1555 applied the fiduciary principle to union officials only
in their handling of "money or other property" (see S.1555,
sec. 610), apparently leaving other questions to the common
law of the several states. Although the common law covers the
matter, we considered it important to write the fiduciary prin-
ciple explicitly into Federal labor legislation. Accordingly, the
committee bill extends the fiduciary principle to all the activities of
union officials and other union agents or representatives. 12
The House version of section 501(a) was eventually adopted as the of-
ficial version. The legislative history of that section explicitly reveals
that it was not intended to limit the fiduciary obligations of union offi-
cials to "money or other property," but rather was intended to in-
9 See 105 GONG, REC. 5985-91 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 7, at 1020-25.
However, Minority Views accompanying Senate Report No. 187 deplored the ab-
sence of such a provision and promised a floor amendment "designed to fill this un-
justifiable vacuum." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1959), reprinted in I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 397, 468.
9 The amendment was accepted by the Senate on April 23, 1959, two days before
Senate passage of S. 1555. See 105 CONG, REC. 6523-28 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 1128-34.
10 § 610 of S. 1555, as it passed the Senate, contains the following language:
Every officer, agent, or other representative of a labor organization en-
gaged in an industry afkcting commerce, or of a trust in which such or-
ganization is interested, shall, with respect to any money or other property
in his custody or possession by virtue of his position as such officer, agent,
or representative, have a relationship of trust to any such labor organiza-
tion and the members thereof, or to any such trust and the beneficiaries
thereof, and shall be responsible in a fiduciary capacity for such money or
other property, notwithstanding any exculpatory clause or action purport-
ing to except him from such responsibility.
See I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 576-77.
" See H.R. 8342, § 501, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HisTmtv, supra note 7, at 730-32.
12 H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HIS-TORY, supra note 7, at 839 (emphasis added).
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corporate into federal labor legislation "a large body of existing law
applicable to trustees, and a wide variety of agents." 13
The text of section 501 itself is also revealing. The first sentence
of section 50I(a) states merely that there exists a trust relationship be-
tween union officers and their union; it imposes no explicit duties."
The enforceable duties imposed on union officers appear in the sec-
ond sentence of the section, which applies fiduciary obligations to: (1)
holding, managing, and spending of union funds; (2) dealing with ,the
union as an adverse party; and (3) acquiring or holding any interest
which conflicts with the interests of the labor organization.' 3 The en-
forcement mechanism of section 501 is found in section 501(b),"
which provides a procedure by which any member of a labor organi-
zation can sue "[w]hen any officer, agent, shop steward, or
representative of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the
duties declared in subsection (a) of this section ...." 17
A close reading of subsections (a) and (b) of section 501 clearly
indicates that despite the breadth of the fiduciary obligation it is the
enumerated duties of section 501(a) which comprise the enforceable
legal obligations. Thus, despite the fact that it may be necessary for a
court to evaluate whether certain conduct is in the best interests of the
members of a labor organization, the language of section 501
establishing the existence of a fiduciary relationship between union
representatives and union members should not be construed as an in-
vitation to courts to impose their views regarding the management of
the internal affairs of labor organizations.
The nature of the fiduciary obligation owed to an organization
necessarily varies with the type of organization involved and the prob-
lems confronted by it. Section 501(a) explicitly recognizes that the
fiduciary obligations imposed upon union officials must be tempered
with concern for "the special problems and functions of a labor or-
ganization."'H This proviso to the fiduciary standards of section 501(a)
' 3 Id.
"See 29 U.S.C. 501(a) (1970). Generally, however, the extent of the fiduciary
duty , in a trust relationship is wide-ranging:
One of the most important duties of a trustee is that of loyalty to the ben-
eficiaries. While he is administering the trust he must refrain from plac-
ing himself in a position where his personal interest or that of a third per-
son does or may conflict with the interest of the beneficiaries. All his con-
duct which has any bearing on the affairs of the trust must be actuated by
consideration of the welfare of the beneficiaries and them alone.
G. BOGER'F, LAW OF Tuus .rs, 343-44 (5th ed. 1973). See II A. Scorr, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, 170 (3d ed. 1967). Analysis of the interests of the fiduciary and beneficiary is,
of course, the antithesis of per se reasoning, which requires no evaluation of interests,
but merely a factual determination that certain patterns of conduct have occurred. See
text and note 6 supra.
I s See 29 U.S.C. 501(a) (1970).
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970).
"Id.
"29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81
(1959), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 839; Clark, The Fiduciary
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seems to demand that courts exercise restraint in determining
whether to intervene in the affairs of a labor organization.
Apparent in the legislative history of section 501 is congressional
recognition that labor organizations are inherently political organiza-
tions, and this factor should distinguish the fiduciary obligations
applicable to union officials from the fiduciary obligations owed by
persons in various other trust relationships, such as trustees of an
estate or corporate officers." Certain situations will arise where the
political nature of a labor organization might dictate that the obliga-
tion owed to that organization demands conduct of a very special na-
ture." There may be times when forceful and aggressive leadership is
demanded. There will be other times when passive leadership is more
advantageous.
By imposing common-law fiduciary obligations on union officials
in the context of the LMRDA, Congress implicitly recognized that the
type of leadership which is best for a labor organization and its mem-
bers as a group will be a matter on which reasonable minds may dif-
fer. The political nature of the labor organization is therefore a key
factor to be weighed when a court measures an officer's conduct
against his fiduciary obligations.
1I. THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN UNION AFFAIRS: THE
LIMITS OF SECTION 501 FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the courts of appeals
have applied varying standards to determine the propriety of judicial
intervention in resolving intraunion conflicts. Generally, the courts of
appeals have disagreed on the limits of fiduciary obligations under
section 501 concerning the questions of whether those obligations ex-
tend beyond the control of money or other property, and whether
courts may substitute their judgment for the judgment of union offi-
cials in the context of union policy conflicts. This section will examine
first the "narrow" and "broad" views of the limits of section 501
fiduciary obligations, and second the disagreement among courts of
appeals over judicial intervention in internal union political affairs.
A. The Narrow and Broad Views of Section 501(a): Fiduciary Obligations
Beyond the Control of Money and Property
Despite the clear language of the statutory provision and its
Duties of Union Officials under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REV. 437, 446
(1967).
" See H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959), reprinted in I LEGISLA•
'FIVE HISTORY, supra note 7, at 839; Dugan, Fiduciary Obligations Under the New Act, 48
GE°. L.J. 277, 278-79 (1959) (distinguishing various types of fiduciary relationships and
obligations).
"But cf Carr v. Learner, 547 F.2d 135, 138, 94 L.R.R.M. 2289, 2291 (1st Cir.
1976) (while "a fiduciary relationship implies certain affirmative as well as negative obli-
gations," optimal results are not demanded).
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legislative history, two views of section 501(a) have emerged, charac-
terized as the narrow and broad views." Under the narrow view of
section 501(a) the fiduciary obligations of union officials are only
applicable when the money or property of the union is involved, while
under the broad view there is no such limitation on fiduciary obliga-
tions.
1. The Narrow View of Section 501(a): The View of the
Second Circuit
Gurton v. Aron,s 22 is considered the leading case adopting the nar-
row view of section 501(a). In Gurton, plaintiffs were members of
Local 802 of the American Federation of Musicians; defendants were
local and federation officers. 23 Many of the members of Local 802
were not employed full time as musicians but were employed in other
types of work as well." Hence any requirements imposed by the local
which would require a member to appear during business hours at
the offices of the local would tend to discriminate against the partici-
pation of part-time musicians in the affairs of the local." Those who
could appear at the local's offices were primarily full-time musicians."
A mail vote was taken of all members on the question whether future
elections of officers should be by secret ballot mail vote or whether a
personal appearance should still be required; a substantial majority
voted that future elections should be conducted by a mail vote."
Plaintiffs proposed amendments to the union bylaws which would
have effectively rescinded the mandate of the mail referendum, since
the bylaw amendments would have required voting members to reg-
ister in person at the office of the Secretary during business hours."
These proposed amendments were considered and adopted at a
membership meeting. The officers of Local 802 appealed the action to
the International Executive Board of the American Federation of
Musicians, which in turn declared the resolutions null and void on the
grounds that they had been adopted at a packed meeting."
Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the refusal to enforce the
resolutions violated section 501(a), 3° and seeking an order directing
the local's officials to act in accordance with the resolutions passed at
"This dichotomy has also been characterized as the "minority" (narrow) view
and the "majority" (broad) view. See Cefalo v. Moffett, 449 F.2d 1193, 1198 n.15, 78
L.R.R.M. 2142, 2146 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23 339 F.2d 371, 58 L.R.R.M. 2080 (2d Cir.), aff g Guarnaccia v. Kenin, 234 F.
Supp. 429, 57 L.R.R.M. 2310 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
23 339 F.2d at 372, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2080.
" Id. at 373, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2081.
25
 Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 372, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2080.
28 1d. at 372-73, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2080-81.
"Id. at 373, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2081.
30 Id. at 373-74, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2081-82.
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the membership meeting." The district court dismissed the actions. 32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed."
The Second Circuit in GurtOn found no irregularity in the in-
ternal means by which the dispute was handled by the union. There-
fore, since the actions of the union's supreme governing body were
not arbitrary, the court refused to find a breach of fiduciary obliga-
tions." With respect to the section; 501 claim, the court of appeals ob-
served:
The provisions of the L.M.R.D.A. were not intended by
Congress to constitute an invitation to the courts to in-
tervene at will in the internal, affairs of unions. Courts have
no special expertise in the operation of unions which would
justify a broad power to interfere. The internal operations
of unions are to be left to the officials chosen by the mem-
bers to manage those operations except in the very limited
instances expressly provided by the Act. The conviction of
some judges that they are better able to administer a un-
ion's affairs than the elected officials is wholly without
foundation. Most unions are honestly and efficiently ad-
ministered and are much more likely to continue to be so if
they are free from officious: intermeddling by the courts.
General supervision of unions by the courts would not con-
tribute to the betterment of unions or their members or to
the cause of labor-management relations."
Thus, the Gurton court implicitly acknowledged the political nature of
the labor union, and recognized that any judicial intervention in
union affairs under the authority of section 501 places the court,
rather than elected union officials, in the position of determining the
best interests of the labor union. The court in Gurton wisely refused to
make such a determination, finding no breach of fiduciary duty so
long as the union officials followed fair and regular procedures in re-
solving the political controversy."
This aspect of the Gurton court's opinion — that courts should be
slow to intervene in the internal affairs of unions — has not generated
" Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 2080.
" 234 F. Supp, 429, 444, 57 L.R.R.M, 2310, 2321-22 (S.D.N.Y, 1964).
" 339 F.2d at 375, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2083.3.41d .
as Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 2082-83; see; Local No. 1, Broadcast Employees v, In-
ternational Bhd, of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 274, 94 L.R.R.M. 2089, 2097 (F.D.
Pa. 1976).
The LMRDA policy of minimizing judicial intervention in internal union affairs
has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, and should be considered by
a court before intervening in a union's affairs by deciding that an official has breached
his or her fiduciary obligations to the union. See Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blow-
ers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 471 & n.10 (1968).
36 339 P.M at 375, 58 L.R.R.M, at 2083.
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controversy. However, other language in the opinion has fostered
criticism:
It is	 clear that Section 501 of the L.M.R.D.A. has no
application to the present controversy. A simple reading of
the section shows that it applies to fiduciary responsibility
with respect to the money and property of the union and
that it is not a catch-all provision under which union offi-
cials can be sued on any ground of misconduct with which
the plaintiffs choose to charge them. If further corrobora-
tion for this position be needed it will be found in the legis-
lative history and in the law review articles cited by Judge
Tenney in his opinion in the district court. 37
Thus the Gurton court read section 501 as imposing fiduciary obliga-
tions on union officials only with respect to the management of the
money or property of the union. The difficulty with this view is that
the court's observation in fact is directly contradicted by the legislative
history of section 501, which indicates a broader definition of the
fiduciary obligations of union officials." It was not necessary for the
Gurton. court to find that the fiduciary obligation imposed by section
501 does not extend beyond money or property matters in order for
it to hold that the internal affairs of the union generally should be left
to the members to manage. Unfortunately, this dictum in Gurton has
"Id., 58 L.R.R.M. at 2082 (footnote omitted). Judge Tenney's reading of the
legislative history is open to some criticism. In Judge Tenney's discussion of the legisla-
tive history of section 501(a), he comments that:
The legislative history of the Section would appear to also be in accord
with defendants' position that the Section relates solely to questions of fi-
nancial dealings. Thus, during the course of debate, Senators McClellan
and Ervin made it quite clear that the Section would relate solely to mat-
ters of money and property. See 11 Leg. History 1129-31 (1959).
234 F. Supp. at 442, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2320. Unfortunately, the debate to which Judge
Tenney refers concerned the Senate version of the bill, see text and notes 7-10 supra,
which was never passed. See text and notes 11-13 supra.
This oversight was noted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pignotti v.
Local ,#3 Sheet Metal Workers Inel Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825, 832-34, 83 L.R.R.M. 2081,
2086-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1069 (1973) which detailed the legislative his-
tory of section 501(a). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit has remained adamant in its po-
sition. In Head v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398, 88
L.R.R.M. 3057 (2d Cir. 1975), the court of appeals conceded that the Gurton analysis of
the legislative history was something less than piercing. Nonetheless the court asserted
that:
The legislative history cited in Pignotti ... does not convince us that § 501
was intended by Congress to cover union abuses having nothing to do with
money or property. While it is true that § 501 as enacted is somewhat
more explicit in its detail than the corresponding provision originally
passed by the Senate, see Section 610 of S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
61.62 (1959), the final bill nevertheless defines the fiduciary duties of
union officers solely in terms of their treatment of the "money and prop-
erty" of the union and their financial dealings vis-a-vis the union.
Id. at 401 n.3, 88 L.R.R.M. at 3059 n.3.
as See note 37 supra.
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overshadowed the remainder of an otherwise well-reasoned opinion,"
and has provided the focus for later criticism of the opinion as a
whole by those courts adopting the broad view of section 501(a)
fiduciary obligations."
2. The Broad View of Section 501(a): The Majority View
The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Johnson v. Nelson' and Pignotti v. Local #3, Sheet
Metal Workers International Association 42 are the leading cases adopting
the broad view of section 501(a). In these decisions, the Eighth Circuit
explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's view that the scope of section
501(a) is restricted only to money and property matters. 43
I n Johnson, plaintiffs were members of a local who had expressed
a desire to run a slate of candidates in opposition to those in office."
Before they could present any nominations, the officers of the local
charged the members involved with violating various union rules. 45
Plaintiffs eventually prevailed in defending these charges, but in-
curred attorneys' fees in the process; 48 Wishing to compensate the
plaintiffs for their expenses, and pursuant to the local's constitutional
provisions, the membership approved a resolution that the attorneys'
fees be paid by the local." Despite the resolution, the president of the
local and the governing body of the International refused to pay the
fees. 48
 Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the union officers had breached
their fiduciary obligations to the union by their refusal to disburse the
funds as mandated by the resolution." The district court sustained
the plaintiffs' position. 5° On appeal, the defendant officers contended
that the fiduciary obligations imposed by section 501(a) related only to
financial or money-related responsibilities. 51
 The court of appeals dis-
agreed:
[lit plainly appears that the statute is brciad in its reach. Of-
ficers and other union representatives may not act ad-
" See, e.g., Head v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S, Clerks, 512 F.2d 398,
400-01, 88 L.R.R.M. 3057, 3058 (2d Cir. 1975).
"See, e.g., Pignotti v. Local #3 Sheet Metal Workers 1nel Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825,
834-35, 83 L.R.R.M. 2081, 2086-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973);
Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1251, 79 L.R.R.M. 2993, 2996 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972); Cefalo v. Moffett, 449 F.2d 1193, 1198 n.15, 78 L.R.R.M.
2142, 2146 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" 325 F.2d 646, 55 L.R.R.M. 2060 (8th Cir. 1963).
42 477 F.2d 825, 83 L.R.R.M. 2081 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973).
43 See text and notes 21-36 supra.
44 325 F.2d at 647-48, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2061.
45 1d. at 648, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2061.
4° Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees totalled $3,475. Id.
41 Id.
"Id. at 648-49, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2062.
42 Id. at 649, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2062.
°° 212 F. Stipp. 233, 256, 52 L.R.R.M. 2047, 2064-65 (D. Minn. 1963).
" 325 F.2d at 649, 55 L.R.R.M, at 2062.
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versely to their organization or the members as a group, or
acquire a personal interest which'is contrary to the interests
of the organization. Being trustees the officers must subvert
their own personal interests to the lawful mandates and or-
ders of the organization.52
Thus, the Johnson court read section 501 as imposing a wide range of
fiduciary obligations on union officials. The court then indicated that
the dispute essentially involved the rights of union members. The
union had voted to reimburse plaintiffs for the fees they had in-
curred, and the defendants had subverted the express will of the
membership. The defendants' acts rested on no purported authoriza-
tion from the union membership." From this, the court concluded:
[A]ppellants "occupy positions of trust," yet they have
breached that trust .... [They] have allowed their personal
feelings toward appellees to interfere with their duties as
officers; have refused to pay the bills even though ap-
proved by the membership; have employed various tactics
in an unsuccessful attempt to attain local approval for their
conduct; have solicited support for their wrongful behavior
from the International and have thus assumed positions
adverse to the interest of the local union as expressed in a
majority vote, duly authorized by the union constitution. 54
The court thus indicated that the union officers' personal animosity
toward union members did not justify interference with the express
will of the membership.
The court in Johnson made it clear, however, that it was the ex-
pressed will of the membership together with a consideration of the
interests of the labor organization as a whole which define the scope
of union officers' fiduciary obligation. The scope of the officers'
fiduciary obligation does not emanate from some other source such as
an inflexible rule already formulated.
Of course, it is of prime significance here that a duly au-
thorized constitutional majority of Local's members voted to
pay appellees' expenses; that these expenses were incurred
pursuing rights which are of substantial benefit to Local as
a whole; that a personal animosity toward appellees moti-
vated appellants' refusal to pay the expenses; and that the
International's eleventh-hour "policy" directive was not
based upon union constitutional authority, and was not, in
fact, the real cause for appellants' conduct. We are by no
means announcing a rule requiring payment of attorney's
52 Id. at 650, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2063.
' 3 1d. at 652-53, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2065.
64 Id. at 653, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2065.
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fees to successful union member litigants ... regardless of
the circumstances."
The court in Johnson therefore limited its imposition of liability upon
union officials to those situations in which the facts clearly reveal that
the officials have acted both without constitutional authority and
against the best interests of the union and its membership. For pur-
poses of evaluating the fiduciary obligation, the court found that de-
.1fendants had placed their own self-interest — their personal animosity
toward plaintiffs — above the interest of their labor organization, and
thereby breached their fiduciary obligation."
In holding that the union officials had violated their fiduciary
obligations, the court passed judgment upon the merits of the un-
derlying dispute by indicating that the expenses incurred were of sub-
stantial benefit to the local." The court's approach in Johnson is thus
consistent with standard fiduciary analysis, which requires a de-
termination of the benefits to the interests of the labor organization. 58
However, since the court was not forced to evaluate the political
merits of the local's resolution, in fact the holding of the court does
not represent a broader reading of, the fiduciary obligation than that
of the Gurton court, save for the dictum in Gurton regarding the
money and property of the labor organization."
A second case exemplifying the majority view is Pignotti v. Local
#3, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association. 6 ° In Pignotti, plaintiff
was a member of the defendant local." Four of the defendants were
individual officers of the local, and two were officers of the In-
ternational." The local and an association of employers had entered
into a collective bargaining agreement whereby the association was to
deduct a designated amount from the wages of the local's members
and to pay that amount into a pension fund designated by the local."
In order to determine the best plan for it to adopt, the local
established a committee to study pension plans sponsored by in-
surance companies, a savings and loan association, and the National
Fund of the International." The Committee, however, was unable to
reach a decision on which plan to adopt, and a membership meeting
was then called to consider the pension matter. At this meeting, the
National Fund Plan was rejected.", Following a series of meetings at
which the different, plans were discussed, the International, on a re-
"Id. at 653-54, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2066.
"See 29 U.S.C. 501(a) (1970).
" 325 F.2d at 653, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2065.
1" See text and note 14 supra.
" See text and notes 22-36 supra.
0° 477 F.2d 825, 83 L.R.R.M. 2081 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973).
"Id. at 827, 83 L,R.R.M. at 2082.
	 '
"Id.
" Id.
"Id. at 827-28, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2082.
" 1 1d. at 828, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2082.
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quest from the local president, indicated that the local had not fol-
lowed proper procedure at the meeting where the members had re-
jected the National Fund Plan." The International then called a spe-
cial meeting at which the members present voted to adopt the Na-
tional Fund Plan." The anti-pension forces in the local circulated a
petition for a second special meeting; the local officers, however, did
not respond. Accordingly, plaintiffs sued," alleging in part that de-
fendants had breached their section 501(a) fiduciary duties. 69 The
federal district court held for the plaintiffs, finding that "defendants
... set out to obtain the participation of Local #3 in the National
Plan, whether the majority of the Union wanted the Plan or not." 7°
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."
In Pignotti, defendants attempted to avoid liability under section
501 by contending that their fiduciary duties extended only to situa-
tions involving the money or property of the union. 72
 The court dis-
agreed, citing Johnson" as authority for the proposition that broad
fiduciary duties are imposed on the officers, agents, shop stewards
and other representatives of a labor organization. 74 After reviewing
the legislative history of the Act," the court found that "the broader
view of fiduciaries' responsibilities is correct, based on Congressional
intent and the explicit language of § 501(a)." 76 In so holding, the
court explicitly rejected the decision in Gurton:
[lit appears clear that Gurton v. Arons, based as it was on
the legislative history of the Kennedy-Ervin Bill which was
amended out of existence, was unduly restrictive of the
scope of the fiduciary duties of union officials commanded
by § 501, and that Johnson v. Nelson, basing its decision on
the legislative history of the Elliot Bill, was properly de-
cided."
The Eighth Circuit in Pignotti gave no extensive consideration to the
actual nature of a fiduciary obligation. Rather, the court's reasoning
adopted the rubric of "broad" duties to resolve questions of internal
management of union affairs that in fact may not easily be resolved in
cases where the officials' conduct is less egregious. The court may
66 Id., 83 L.R.R.M. at 2083.
67 1d. at 829, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2083.
"Id.
fi° Petitioners, of course, did not claim that either the local or the International
had violated section 501, since the section applies only to union officers acting in their
individual capacity. See id. at 832, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2085.
7° 343 F. Supp. 236, 242, 80 L.R.R.M. 2699, 2705 (D. Neb. 1972).
71 477 F.2d at 836, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2089.
"Id. at 832, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2085-86.
73 325 F.2d 646, 55 L.R.R.M. 2060. See text and notes 44-59 supra.
74 477 F.2d at 832, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2086.
"Id. at 833-34, L.R.R.M. at 2086-87. See text and notes 7-20 supra.
"Id. at 835, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2088.
" Id. at 834, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2088.
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have been unduly influenced by the facts of the case, finding that the
defendants had thwarted the express wishes of the members of their
local." In fact, the defendants had subverted no procedure mandated
by the organization and had done only what the union's constitution
and bylaws permitted."
B. Intervention in Intraunion Policy Disputes: The judicial Role in Union
Internal Political Affairs
In addition to the differences among the circuits in determining
whether fiduciary obligations of union officials extend beyond the
control of money or other property, the courts of appeals have dis-
agreed on the propriety of judicial intervention in internal union pol-
icy disputes. In both Garton and Pignotti the defendants committed
qualitatively analogous transgressions in that the local officers, after
receiving instructions from their internationals, acted in a manner
which offended dissident members.8 ° However, the resulting views of
the courts are diametrically opposed: whereas the court in Gurton re-
fused to substitute its judgment for that of the union officials, the
court in Pignotti readily intervened in the internal affairs of the union.
Indeed, the most important difference between Pignotti and Gurton
may lie not in the Garton dictum that section 501(a) does not extend
beyond money and property matters of the union, but rather in the
contrasting degree of intervention into union internal affairs. The
court in Gurton refused to embroil itself in the internal political affairs
of the local." In contrast, the court in Pignotti thrust itself into the in-
ternal affairs of the local, siding with the anti-pension forces."
Intervention by courts into internal union affairs contains many
pitfalls. To illustrate, consider the facts of the Pignotti case from a
slightly different perspective. Providing for the welfare of its members
is a special function of a labor organization, which a court should con-
III the district court, Judge Denney concluded that:
It is clear to the Court that all of the defendants have breached their
fiduciary duties in allowing their personal feelings to interfere with their
duties as officers. ... [One) went so far as to use the facilities of Local #3
to publish and influence the views of the members. Then, having finally
achieved an affirmative vote, [the defendants) delayed any other vote. Un-
able to delay any longer, they did the next best thing and refused to im-
plement the vote ... against the National Plan.
343 F. Supp. at 243, 80 L.R.R.M. at 2705. '
"In fact, the local president requested a ruling from the International on the
propriety of the procedure, and only proceeded after receiving a ruling that the prior
procedure had been improper. 477 F.2d at 828, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2083..
8° See text and notes 22-40 AVM.
81 See text and notes 34-36 supra.
88 Even in Johnson, where a breach of fiduciary obligations was found, the court
had a very clear indication of what the best interests of defendants' labor organization
were, and it was plain that the officers had violated their fiduciary obligations. See text
and notes 44-59 supra.
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sider when applying section 501(a). 83 The pension plan in Pignotti
thus was clearly an element in the welfare of employees at the time
the contract with the employers' association was ratified. Moreover,
because the members of the local worked for different contractors as
work became available, some assurance of portability in the chosen
plan was essential. Were it true that the International Plan did pro-
vide for portable benefits while the plans of the insurance companies
and the savings and loan association did not so provide, the bests in-
terests of the membership would call for adoption of the plan pro-
posed by the defendants." Nonetheless, the court in Pignotti gave no
consideration to these variables.
When a court does choose to intervene in the affairs of a labor
organization, it must be prepared to make a determination of the in-
terests of the union as a group, since without such a determination
the court is unable to examine the nature of the fiduciary obligation
of union officials under section 501(a). 85 Moreover, if the fiduciary
obligation is defined in this manner, it becomes at least conceivable
that the best interests of the labor organization and its members might
not be those expressed in a vote taken at any particular meeting.
Hence the conclusion is compelling that even an apparent infringe-
ment on the voting rights of union members should not be conclusive
proof that fiduciary obligations to the labor organization guaranteed
under section 501(a) have been breached."
Yet even in circuits adopting the broad view of fiduciary re-
sponsibilities under section 501(a), the courts have exhibited a pro-
pensity toward per se analysis. Such per se analysis is not suitable
when the interest of the labor organization is properly considered."
83 See generally Tyler, Section 501(a) and the Proper Function of Unions, in SYMPOSIUM
ON THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr 542, 546-49 (R. Slovenko
ed. 1961).
" Neither the district court nor the court of appeals investigated the details of
the competing plans.
83 In Pignotti, the court hypothetically could have put itself in the position of hav-
ing to comply with the fiduciary standards imposed by section 409 of the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1109 (Supp. V 1975), if the
act had been in effect at the time, since the union officials demonstrated that some
union members, not parties to the suit, had vested rights in the pension fund which
would be destroyed. See Pignotti, 477 F.2d at 836, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2089.
" See Note, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204-05 (1975). cf. Safe Workers' Organiza-
tion v. Ballinger, 389 F. Supp. 903, 910-11, 89 L.R.R.M. 2813, 2818 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (a
new federal right to vote was created by section 101 of the LMRDA, but section 50l(a)
created no new federal rights; it provided only an additional forum for enforcing rights
already recognized in state courts). But cf. Semancik v. UMW, District 5, 466 F.2d 144,
155, 80 L.R.R.M. 3475, 3482 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Union officers, including those on a Dis-
trict Executive Board, have a fiduciary duty under Section 501 of the LMRDA ... to
insure the political rights of all members of their organization.").
" In Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 69 L.R.R.M. 2782 (9th Gr. 1968), the
court noted that the general purpose of the LMRDA was to further union democracy,
and indicated that Congress turned to the concept of the derivative suit maintainable by
shareholders of a corporation: "The basic principle of the derivative suit is that the
duties allegedly violated by corporate officers are owed to the organization and only
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III. THE OPERATION OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN
THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS: FOUR REPRESENTATIVE ILLUSTRATIONS
Four relatively common scenarios in the context of labor organi-
zations will be considered in this section in order to demonstrate the
dysfunctional aspects of per se analysis. Per se analysis of section
501(a) fiduciary obligations falls short where the union official: (I)
acts contrary to a union resolution, bylaw or constitutional provision;
(2) refuses to hold a meeting or a vote in situations where such are
apparently mandated by the rules of the organization; (3) controls a
meeting or a vote on a resolution, bylaw or union constitutional
amendment; or (4) arguably fails to bargain in the interests of the un-
ion.
A. Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Responsibilities Arising from a Union
Official's Failure to Act According to a Union Resolution, Bylaw or
Constitutional Provision
One relatively common situation in which allegations of breaches
of fiduciary responsibility arise involves the acts of union officials
allegedly in contravention of a resolution, bylaw or constitutional pro-
vision of the union. It is submitted that such acts should not be
deemed per se violative of section 501(a) since the acts ultimately may
be in the best interests of the labor organization." Instead, courts in
these situations should engage in close analysis of the fiduciary obliga-
tions of the labor officials to determine whether a breach of section
501(a) has actually taken place.
secondarily or derivatively to the shareholder or representative of all shareholders. Sec-
tion 501(a), establishing the duties of labor officers, adopts this concept ... ." Id. at 831,
69 L.R.R.M. at 2785-86. Hence in Phillips, the court did not permit a non-member of
the union to maintain an action under section 501(a). See id., 69 L.R.R.M. at 2786.
This holding seems consistent with the proposition that in order to enforce the
fiduciary obligation a court must determine the best interests of a labor organization,
since the fiduciary obligations of union officials are owed to unions and their members.
The interests of non-members have at best only a remote connection with these obliga-
tions. Only when the best interests of the union have been determined can the court
decide whether those interests have been sufficiently advanced by the officials' conduct.
See Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F. Supp. 890, 895, 51 L.R.R.M. 2758, 2763 (S.D.N.Y.)
affd per curiam, 311 F.2d 1, 2, 51 L.R.R.M. 2764, 2765 (2d Cir. 1962) (the court refused
to permit the intervention of the union on behalf of defendant officers since "it appears
to this court that there is a serious question of conflict inherent in the conduct of the
two individual defendants and the interests of the union ..."); cf. Morrissey v. Segal,
526 F.2d 121, 127, 90 L.R.R.M. 3169, 3172-73 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorneys' fees incurred
by die individual trustees "did not in any way inure to the benefit" of a pension trust
and so should not by paid by the trust).
88 This position merely expresses the conclusion that the fact that union members
vote or otherwise express their immediate sentiments does not mean that the resolution,
bylaw or constitutional provision is necessarily in the best interests of the labor organiza-
tion or its members as a group. This approach would not affect other sections of the
LMRDA such as section 101(a), 29 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1970), which provides that all union
members shall have equal rights, including the right to vote.
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Consistent with this approach, actual compliance with a union
resolution, bylaw or constitutional provision should not be considered
per se compliance with the fiduciary obligations imposed by section
501(a). 89
 Rather, compliance with the union resolution, bylaw or con-
stitutional provision should be evidentiary only, and not conclusive.
This flexible view of section 501(a) and the nature of the
fiduciary obligations itself has not received wide acceptance. For
example, in Morrissey v. Curran," plaintiffs, members of the National
Maritime Union, brought suit alleging violation of section 501 against
the president of the union, the secretary-treasurer, an assistant to the
president, and the trustees of the union Officers' Pension Plan."
Plaintiffs contended that prior payments made to the union trust fund
had been made in violation of the union constitution,° 2
 and accord-
ingly sought an accounting, a judgment for money damages suffered
by the union or the trust fund, and an injunction preventing further
payments into the trust made on behalf of appointed union
employees." The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that there in fact had been a breach of de-
fendants' fiduciary obligations: "Since the 1960 Constitution did not
authorize the inclusion of the non-officers in the Pension Plan and it
is not denied that funds of the NMU have been paid to the Trustees
for disbursal to the non-officers under the Pension Plan, plaintiffs are
entitled to relief under 29 U.S.C. § 501.' 1' 4 The district court there-
fore granted in tato the relief sought by the plaintiffs." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding of a breach of fiduciary duty."
89 See, e.g., Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1252, 79 L.R.R.M. 2993, 2997
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972) (the rule that courts will accept the interpreta-
tion of a union's rules by union authorities does not "give carte blanche to union activity
which is alleged to constitute a violation of the broad fiduciary duties of union officials
under the LMRDA"); Terrazas v. Fitzsimmons, 88 L.R.R.M. 2629, 2632 (C.D. Cal.
1974) (actions taken pursuant to constitutional or bylaw procedures "cannot serve as a
predicate for a § 501(a) violation unless such actions are shown to be not 'for the ben-
efit of the organization and its members' or are materially inconsistent with the constitu-
tion or bylaws of the Union"); Puma v. Brandenburg, 324 F. Supp. 536, 544, 76
L.R.R.M. 2890, 2895 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (the union did not violate its constitution when
the local adopted a pension plan for its officers, since pensions are part of an officer's
salary; but "merely because an Executive Board has the power to set officers' salaries
(including pensions), does not mean that it has unlimited power to do so" under section
501). Contra, McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1163, 90 L.R.R.M. 2401, 2405 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) (constitution, bylaws, and resolutions of the
union define the union officer's fiduciary responsibilities).
°° 302 F. Supp. 32, 71 L.R.R.M. 2643 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 923 F.2d 393, 73
L.R.R.M. 2640 (2d.Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970).
" 302 F. Supp. at 33, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2643-44.
" Id. at 34, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
"M. at 33, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
" Id. at 35, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
"Id. at 36, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2696.
96
 423 F.2d at 400, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2645. The court of appeals reversed the
district court's refusal to declare invalid certain amendments to the union constitution,
from which denial the plaintiffs had appealed. See id.
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The district court in Morrissey,  in determining that the de-
fendants had breached their fiduciary obligations, utilized a per se
approach to the violation of section 501. Violation of the union con-
stitution was, in the view of the court, a per se violation of the
fiduciary obligations of section 501." Neither the district court nor
the court of appeals considered the actual interests of the labor or-
ganization involved to determine the best interests of the
membership—especially with respect to the union's appointive
employees." The court noted that most of the employees covered by
the union trust were entitled to pension benefits under some other
plan,°9 Therefore, it is at least arguable that the best interests of the
labor organization were served by providing some sort of pension
plan for appointive employees in a situation where all of their peers
were already entitled to such benefits.'"
The court's analysis of the fiduciary obligation in Morrissey was
deficient in failing to consider the possibility that the acts of the union
officials had actually served the best interests of the organization as a
whole. While violation of a union's resolution, bylaw or constitution
should be evidence of a breach of the duty to serve the interest of the
union members, the strength of the inference drawn decreases when
there is a showing that the interests of the union were actually ad-
vanced by the officials' activities. Per se analysis prevents such an ap-
proach.'°'
Close scrutiny of the fiduciary obligation of the labor official
may well reveal that in certain circumstances, the official has acted in
the best interests of the labor organization despite his or her violation
97 See 302 F. Supp. at 35, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
95 The district court merely concluded that the fact of payment constituted a vio-
lation of section 501. See id. The court of appeals employed a similar approach. See 423
F.2d at 398-99, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2644-45.
" See 423 F.2d at 395, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2641.
"a On the other hand, the district court observed that a 1960 amendment to the
union constitution explicitly terminated the authority to include non-officers in the
union pension fund by deleting the words "and employees" from the constitutional
pension authority. 302 F. Supp. at 34, 71 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
101 But rf. Hood v. Journeyman Barbers, 454 F.2d 1347, 1355, 79 L.R.R.M, 2292,
2297 (7th Cir. 1972) (failure to expend pension funds in accord with the pension fund
provisions was itself' "clearly in breach of the fiduciary duties in Section 501(a)");
McCabe v. IBEW Local No. 1377, 415 F.2d 92, 97, 72 L.R.R.M. 2014, 2017-18 (6th Cir.
1969) (unauthorized expenditure of union funds violates the union constitution and
thus is a breach of section 501); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F. Supp, 890, 894, 51
L.R.R.M. 2758, 2762 (S.D.N.Y.), affd per curiatta, 311 F.2d 1, 2, 51 L.R.R.M. 2764, 2765
(2c1 Cir. 1962) (legislative history of the LMRDA supports the view that "Congress
thought it fundamental that the officers of the union should act only in conformity with
the constitution and bylaws of the union , .."). The narrow view of section 501(a) has
dictated to sonic courts that violation of constitutional procedures cannot be a violation
of section 501(a) absent misuse of money or other union property. See Head v.
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 512 F.2d 398, 400, 88 L.R.R.M. 3057,
3058.59 (2d Cir. 1975); Charles v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 595, 598,
59 L.R.R.M. 2207, 2209 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). However, here too the courts engage in per se
analysis in approaching the problems of fiduciary responsibility.
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of the union resolution, bylaw or constitutional provision. In such a
case, it is submitted, a court should find no violation of the section
501(a) fiduciary obligation.
B. Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Responsibility Arising from a Union Official's
Refusal to Hold a Meeting or a Vote
On some occasions, an allegation of breach of fiduciary obliga-
tion involves the failure or refusal on the part of a union official to
call a meeting or vote, where some members have scrupulously fol-
lowed the union procedures for calling the meeting or vote. If the
LMRDA in fact were passed to foster democratic practices in labor un-
ions, it would appear that the failure to call the meeting or vote when
members have followed required constitutional procedures would
amount to the clearest sort of per se breach of fiduciary obligation.'"
Even here, however, a court should be prepared to evaluate the in-
terests of the labor organization in•determining whether the union of-
ficial has breached his or her fiduciary obligation, since the court
should also determine whether the union official has subordinated the
interests of the labor organization to some other interest in refusing to
hold the meeting or vote.
The fiduciary implications of the refusal to hold a meeting or
vote are illustrated by the holding of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Keck v. Employees Independent
Association. 1 ° 3 Plaintiffs in Keck were individual members of the
Employees Independent Association,'° 4
 while defendants were officers
of the Association.' 05
 Pursuant to a constitutional provision, plaintiffs
had initiated a petition for a referendum aimed at amending the
union constitution to allow the Association to merge with another un-
ion.'" Arguing that the Association could not survive the merger, de-
fendants refused to submit the petitions to a vote of the Association,
even though the submission was mandated by the union constitu-
tion.' 07
 Plaintiffs contended before the district court that defendants
had breached their fiduciary obligations in refusing to bring the peti-
tion to a vote.'" The district court found a breach of the defendants'
fiduciary obligations, despite the defendants' contention that the
I " See Kerr v. Shanks, 466 F.2d 1271, 1274-75, 81 L.R.R.M. 2366, 2368-69 (9th
Cir. 1972) (the court refused, however, to determine whether the broad or narrow view
should govern, since even under the narrow view defendants had violated the fiduciary
obligations imposed by the LMRDA); Moschetta v. Cross, 48 L.R.R.M. 2669, 2671
(D.D.C. 1961) (when the right to a special convention had accrued, failure of the un-
ion's General Executive Board to call the special convention constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty).
'" 387 F. Supp. 241, 88 L.R.R.M. 2355 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
'"Id. at 243, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2356.
'°51d. at 244, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2357.
'°6 1d. at 243-44, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2356-57.
'" /d. at 244, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2357.
'"Id. at 243-44, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2357.
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union constitution also prohibited affiliation with another union,'° 9
By acting to prevent a merger, defendants in Keck sought only to
preserve the very existence of the labor organization of which they
were officials since affiliation with another union would have brought
about the demise of their Association."° Thus it is unclear what in-
terest the district court might have felt the officers had favored at the
expense of the interests of their labor organization. At most, the
union officials had favored the interests of the union qua union over
the interests expressed by union members. In finding a violation of
section 501(a), however, the court gave its own construction to the
union constitutional provision, then , applied a per se rule in a matter
of union policy to find a breach of fiduciary obligation on the part of
union officials. The court's conclusion thus seems to require union of-
ficials, consistent with section 501(a) obligations, to acquiesce in the
destruction of their own union.
A better approach would be that a finding that the union offi-
cials' failure to call a meeting or vote when mandated serves as strong
evidence that a breach of fiduciary obligations has occurred. However,
this inference could be rebutted by a showing on the part of the offi-
109 The rationale of the court in resolving this constitutional dilemma in favor of
the plaintiffs is the following:
Even accepting defendants' argument, there is nothing that would have
precluded plaintiffs from having accomplished what they intended
through a two step process rather than through the one step process which
they used. lf, instead of petitioning to have the general membership dis-
card the present constitution and replace it with the IBEW Constitution
plaintiffs had petitioned to amend Article XI [the article relied upon by
defendants in their defense] by deleting the words "provided, that by such
affiliation this Association shall not lose its identity nor forfeit any au-
tonomy over its owns affairs" and then had submitted their present
amendment, the General Committee would have been required to submit
the second petition to the general membership because the defense of Ar-
ticle XI would no longer be available. In form there is a distinction be-
tween the two processes; in substance there is none. On balance, we cannot
support defendants' interpretation of the Union Constitution when the
difference between defendants' and plaintiffs' interpretations is slight and
the result of the defendants' interpretation is to deprive the union mem-
bers of the opportunity to determine the direction their union is to take.
Id. at 252, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2363. But cf. Cassidy v. Horan, 66 L.R.R.M. 2521, 2527
(W.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 405 F.2d 230, 70 L.R.R.M. 2221 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendants'
conduct favoring affiliation with another union does not violate their fiduciary re-
sponsibility since their conduct did not involve money or property of the union); Witt-
stein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 59 L.R.R.M. 2335, 2336 (S.13.N.Y. 1965) (de-
fendants' failure to bring up plaintiffs' resolution at convention could not violate
fiduciary responsibility since no property or funds were involved). The two-step
amendment approach suggested by the court is a ruse designed to legitimize court in-
tervention in a matter of internal union policy. The plain fact is that plaintiffs did not
pursue a two-step amendment process. It is not inconceivable that support for such a
constitutional amendment could not have been enlisted on plaintiffs' side. The court
willingly gave its own construction to a constitutional provision. The court's reading of
this union's constitution would render all constitutional provisions of unions meaning-
less, so long as the membership votes to violate such provisions.
"G See 387 F. Supp. at 251-52.
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cials that in fact their conduct served the best interests of the organi-
zation to which they owed fiduciary obligations.'"
C. Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Responsibility Arising from the Union
Official's Controlling a Meeting or a Vote on a Resolution, Bylaw or
Constitutional Amendment
A third set of circumstances in which union members may make
a claim that the union official has breached fiduciary obligations arises
where the union official has exerted considerable influence to domi-
nate a vote on a particular issue. In such a case, the union members
may claim.that the vote did not reflect the accurate sentiments of the
union members. In the absence of allegations of fraud or duress, such
a claim is tantamount to a demand that union officials refrain from
expressing an opinion on matters of union concern, despite their re-
sponsibilities of leadership. When such claims are presented as viola-
tions of section 501(a), it would appear that a court is required to dis-
tinguish between effective union leadership on the one hand and a
fraud upon the union on the other. This analysis, however, is appar-
ently not always undertaken by federal courts presented with such
questions.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
examined the limits on union officials' attempts to influence the
membership in Coleman v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship
Clerks. " 2
 In Coleman, the union passed a resolution at its annual con-
vention creating a new office to be occupied by the outgoing Grand
President." 3
 Plaintiffs sought an injunction restraining the creation of
the office," 4 grounding their claims on an allegation of breach of
fiduciary obligations under section 501(a). Plaintiffs maintained that
the members of the Grand Executive Council had breached their
fiduciary obligations to the union in suppressing information concern-
ing the resolution and in speeding the resolution through the conven-
tion." 5 The plaintiffs also alleged that the outgoing Grand President
lacked honesty, candor and respect for his fiduciary obligations under
the LMRDA." 6
 Since Coleman. was decided in the Second Circuit, the
court of appeals applied the narrow view of section 501(a)," 7 and
since the allegations did not involve the money or property of the un-
ion," 8
 the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim
1 " For example, it might be argued that it is no breach of fiduciary obligations to
refuse to permit a vote on a resolution which would abrogate all democratic processes
in an individual union.
"2
 340 F.2d 206, 58 L.R.R.M. 2220 (2d Cir. 1965).
"3 Id. at 206-07, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2220-21.
" 4 Id. at 207-08. 58 L.R.R.M. at 2222.
" 5 /d, at 209, 58 L.R.R.M. at 2223.
"° Id.
"7 See text and notes 22-40 supra.
"" Because the narrow view of section 501(a) fiduciary obligations is espoused by
the Second Circuit, the court was concerned with the precise nature of the allegations.
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under section 501(0.' 1 "
The application of the inflexible narrow view of the fiduciary ob-
ligations of section 501(a) resulted in the court's failure to analyze the
facts of Coleman in terms of the best interests of the labor union. It
would seem that the members of a labor union, when voting on any
resolution, have an interest in the availability of all relevant informa-
tion.'" Anything less would appear to make the motives of those con-
cealing the information subject to close .scrutiny, especially where the
information concealed would tend to influence voters in a manner in-
consistent With the wishes of the union officials."'
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania approached a similar problem in Highway Truck Drivers
Local 107 v. Cohen,' 22 unencumbered by the narrow view of fiduciary
obligations. In Cohen, plaintiffs were rank-and-file members of the un-
ion, and defendants were the union officials.'" Multiple civil and
criminal actions were brought against the defendants, alleging a "con-
spiracy to cheat and defraud the union of large sums of money. "124
The court concluded:
The charges of the plaintiff refer to the voting on Resolution No. fill and
not to the mishandling of any money or property of the Union. The com-
plaint is that the membership was not given all the information it needed
for voting intelligently and that the Resolution was rushed through the
convention. There are also allegations that [the conduct of the outgoing
Grand President] fell short of that required of him. These claims fail to
allege anything which would constitute a violation of [section 501).
340 F.2d at 209, 58 L.R,R.M. at 2223.
"9 Id.
129 See Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208, 87 L.R.R,M. 2371 (N.D. Ohio
1975), affd in part, 532 F.2d 1074, 91 L.R.R.M. 3070 (fith Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S.
869 (1976), where the court held that:
[T]he duties created in 501(a) must include the duty to keep the mem-
bership informed on matters which they, the rank and file, must decide.
That is not meant to say that union officials may not state their own views
and take a stand on the issues. They must not, however, use their own
right to discuss union matters as an excuse to withhold pertinent, relevant
information. tt is the duty of union leadership under § 501, as fiduciaries,
to see that the lines of communication and dissemination of views and
opinions are kept open and working, especially as to matters on which
members will be asked to vote.
388 F. Supp. at 214, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2374. Cf. Horner v. Ferron. 362 F.2d 224, 231
n.10, 62 L.R.R.M. 2425, 2429 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966) ("Ratifica-
tion of a fiduciary's unauthorized acts cannot be effectuated unless there has been a full
disclosure of the facts"); Puma v. Brandenburg, 324 F. Supp. 536, 545, 76 L.R.R.M.
2890, 2896 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (since members were fairly informed when voting on an of-
ficer's pension plan, there was no breach of fiduciary duty).
" See, e.g., Cefalo v. Moffett, 333 F. Supp. 1283, 1287-88, 78 L.R.R.M. 2137,
2140 (D.D.C.), affil per curiam, 449 F.2d 1193, 78 L.R.R.M. 2142 (D.C. Cir, 1971) (the
defendants violated section 501 by failing to advise the union membership that the
union officers and staff had a pecuniary conflict of interest because their salaries would
increase if a merger with another labor organization were approved).
122 182 F. Supp. 608, 45 L.R.R.M. 3050 (E.D. Pa. 1959), affd, 284 F.2d 162, 47
L.R.R.M. 2040 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
1S3 182 F. Supp. at 610, 45 L.R.R.M. at 3051.
144 Id.
1039
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The members of the local passed a resolution by which the local
would pay the legal expenses of the defendants, since the actions were
purportedly directed at the union itself, rather than solely at the of-
ficers. 125 Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the use of union
funds in this manner, claiming inter alia that the use of union funds
by the officials to pay their own legal expenses violated section 501(a)
regardless of the passage of the resolution.' 26
In passing on the section 501(a) claim, the district court relied on
the ultra vires concept of corporation law in order to evaluate cor-
rectly the interests of the labor organization and its members as a
group:
The defendants argue that this Court is precluded from
passing upon the merit or propriety of the Resolution in
question is peculiarly within the competence of a court to
tween the merit of a resolution and its legality. The latter
question is pecularly within the competence of a court to
pass upon and can not be abandoned finally to the organi-
zation. When a serious question arises as to whether a par-
ticular act is within the legitimate aims and purposes of a
labor union as expressed by its constitution and by-laws, the
Court must ultimately resolve the matter so as to preserve
on the one hand the rights of the union and on the other
those of the individual members of that union.'"
Consistent with this approach, the district court undertook to examine
the interests of the labor union in allotting funds to compensate the
defendants for their legal expenses in the actions brought against
them. The court concluded that the interests of the union were not
sufficiently furthered to justify the resolution.' 28 This ultra vires ap-
proach maximizes the opportunity for the court to evaluate correctly
the interests of the union and its members as a group, and has been
adopted by at least one other federal court. 129
While the facts in Cohen were sufficient to allow the district court
to evaluate the interests of the union and its members, it may not
always be possible to determine when the union official has been
guilty of bad faith in not giving to his or her union all the information
available. Close cases should not be subjected to per se analysis, since
fiduciary analysis- provides a superior approach. Moreover, even if it
cannot be determined that an officer has acted in his own interest or
the interest of a third party at the expense of the labor organization,
the court may still be able to utilize the ultra vires doctrine by which
1 " Id. at 616, 45 L.R.R.M. at 3056.
1 " Id. at 610, 45 L.R.R.M. at 3052.
127 Id, at 618-19, 45 L.R.R.M. at 3058-59 (citations omitted).
I" Id. at 619-22, 45 L.R.R.M. at 3059-61.
"9 See Morrissey v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393, 399, 73 L.R.R.M. 2640, 2644 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970) (without the ultra vires doctrine, "the officers could
find sanctuary by putting through a constitutional amendment or by-law retroactively to
legitimize their former derelictions of duty").
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union resolutions, bylaws or constitutional provisions may be in-
validated. The ultra vires approach focuses on the conduct of the
union membership as a whole, rather than on the conduct of the in-
dividual officers. In close cases, that is where the focus of the court
should be.
D. Alleged Breach of Fiduciary Responsibilities Arising from a Claimed
Failure to Bargain in the Interest of the Labor Organization
A fourth area in which union members have alleged breaches of
fiduciary obligations involves the collective bargaining process, one of
the most sensitive areas of activities undertaken by union officials.
Whenever a collective bargaining agent reaches agreement with man-
agement, there is a substantial likelihood that some members of the
bargaining unit will be dissatisfied. 13 ° In addition to alleging a breach
of the union official's duty of fair representation, 13 ' dissatisfied union
members occasionally have sought damages under section 501(a).' 32
Courts addressing allegations of breaches of fiduciary obligation
grounded in collective bargaining agreements usually have refused to
find a violation of section 501(a). For example, in Echols v. Cook,'" the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia con-
cluded that:
The officers and job stewards of the Union have been
selected in the democratic process as provided by the Con-
stitution and Bylaws of the Union and, as a result, are the
designated representatives of the employees. What the
plaintiffs now request this Court to do is to substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the duly elected collective
bargaining representative of the plaintiffs. Even if it were
to be admitted that the action of the Union here was un-
wise, this is not an issue for determination by the Court.
For this Court to seek to determine whether or not the de-
cision made in this matter was wise would be for the Court
to make itself the collective bargaining representative. It
would also put the Court in the position of a compulsory
130 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("Nhe com-
plete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected"); Carr v. Learner,
547 F.2d 135, 138, 94 L.R.R.M. 2289, 2291 (1st Cir. 1976).
" 1 Where union members claim a failure of union officials to represent their in-
terests fairly, the members may bring an action under section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185 (1970). See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
177 (1967).
I31 On a purely pragmatic level, it is difficult to justify a claim grounded in a vio-
lation of 501(a) involving allegations of failure to bargain effectively, since the plain-
tiff's remedy seems more properly effectuated in a fair representation suit or in a de-
certification petition brought before the National Labor Relations Board. See, e.g., Carr
v. Learner, 547 F.2d 135, 138, 94 L.R.R.M. 2289, 2290 (1st Cir. 1976).
I " 56 L.R.R.M. 3030 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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arbitrator, whereas the parties have never agreed that the
Court could so act.' 34
The district court quite properly abstained from intervention in the
collective bargaining process.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted
a similar position in Carr v. Learner,' 35 where the plaintiffs alleged that
their collective bargaining representative had failed to secure a more
favorable pension plan in the course of negotiations.' 36 Affirming the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action,'" the court of appeals
succinctly denied the validity of the plaintiff's claim: "[W]e do not
think that the fiduciary duty imposed by [section 50I(a)] is violated in
a case where nothing more is alleged than poor performance as a col-
lective bargaining agent."' 38
Any remedy imposed in an action alleging violation of section
501(a) resulting from "poor performance as a collective bargaining
agent" would require the court to place itself in the position of bar-
gaining for the union. Clearly, a court is not qualified to operate as a
bargaining representative, and should not attempt to enforce a
fiduciary obligation under section 501(a) in the context of the collec-
tive bargaining process. Thus, when section 501 violations are alleged
in situations involving the collective bargaining process, courts should
refuse categorically to find violations of section 501(a). This may be
the one instance in which a per se approach to section 501(a) is jus-
tified.
CONCLUSION
Those courts which have decided issues concerning fiduciary ob-
ligations with respect to the internal political affairs of a union have
demonstrated a propensity for the per se type of approach utilized in
some areas of antitrust law. It has been submitted that the per se ap-
proach does not necessarily yield correct results. Instead, courts should
evaluate the interests of the labor organization and its members as a
group with respect to the specific matter in question before passing
judgment on the conduct of a union official.' 39
"1 Id at 3032; see Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425, 431, 85 L.R.R.M. 2786,
2790 (W.D. Pa. 1974). But cf. Schonfeld v. Rarback, 61 L.R.R.M. 2043, 2043-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plaintiffs' allegations that union officers entered into "sweetheart" con-
tracts with employers stated a claim under section 501).
133
 547 F.2d 135, 94 L.R.R.M. 2289 (1st Cir. 1976).
""/d. at 136-37, 94 L.R.R.M, at 2289.
1 " Id. at 138, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2291.
In Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 2290-91.
"" Cf. Parks V. IBEW, 314 F.2d 886, 907-11, 52 L.R.R.M. 2281, 2296-300 (4th
Cir.), cat denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963) (the court refused to intervene in internal union
affairs on the grounds that the officers of the international had pursued the interests of
the international, even though the officers had opposed the interests of a local and its
members).
Some commentators have felt that the per se approach is a proper method of
dealing with intraunion disputes. See, e.g., Note, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. Rev. 367, 405-06
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This evaluative approach is not meant to provide a haven for
racketeers or thugs who happen to find their way into union office,
nor is it meant to retard the growth of democracy in labor unions.
Indeed, the growth of union democracy should be one factor consid-
ered in weighing the interests of the labor organization itself in the
resolution of any allegation of breach of fiduciary obligation. Rather,
it is a plea for rationality when dealing with fiduciary matters. Courts
simply are unable to conduct union affairs better than the union offi-
cials themselves. Judicial management of union internal political af-
fairs is no better than the evils which section 501(a) was designed to
correct.
(1975); Comment, 37 LA. L. lbw, 875, 894-95 (1977). However, where the interests of
the union are complex, it is submitted that a court asked to deal with fiduciary obliga-
tions under section 501 maximizes the opportunity for a correct result by analyzing the
activities of the union officials in the context of the environment of the particular union
involved.
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